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What Do We Mean by "Judicial Independence"?
STEPHEN B. BURBANK*
In this article, the author argues that the concept of 'judicial independence" has
served more as an object of rhetoric than it has of sustained study. He views the
scholarly literatures that treat it as ships passing in the night, each subject to
weaknesses that reflect the needs and fashions of the discipline, but all tending to
ignore courts other than the Supreme Court of the United States. Seeking both
greater rigor and greater flexibility than one usuallyfinds in public policy debates
about, and in the legal and political science literatures on, judicial independence,
the author attributes much of the difficulty to three fundamental shortcomings, the
failure to recognize that (l)judicial independence is not an end ofgovernment but
a means to an end (or ends), (2)judicial independence andjudicial accountability
are not discrete concepts at war with one another, but rather complementary
concepts that can and should be regarded as allies, and (3)judicial independence is
not a monolith.
The author shows how the instrumental approach key to recognizing the first
shortcoming also helps to grasp the second and third, and he explores the
implications of each for the additional research that judicial independence needs
and deserves. That research, he argues, should no longer ignore state courts or
lower federal courts, and neither should it ignore changes in attitudes towards, or
in the practical circumstances of contemporary law and lawmaking. Recognizing
that attention to the different functions that courts perform, even within the same
system, may lead one to consider whether they should be subject to different
arrangements concerningjudicial independence (and accountability), the author
suggests a number of inquiries that might profitably inform the answers to such
questions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In order usefully to discuss why we value or should value judicial independence,
it is necessary to answer the anterior question of what we mean by judicial
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independence. The answer to that question, I believe, is, in the words of William
Jefferson Clinton, "it depends."
Judicial independence exists primarily as a rhetorical notion rather than as a
subject of sustained, organized study. Many scholars assume that a judiciary with at
least some independence is important to the protection of property rights and
individual liberty, if not to the maintenance of democratic governance itself. But legal
writing on the subject all too often seems pail: of a polemical debate between
contending camps. Very little of this work even acknowledges the existence of state
courts, let alone considers how the variety of arrangements governing state judiciaries
might affect general theories of judicial independence. Meanwhile, the political
science literature has not been immune to its own brand of extremism, much work
failing to acknowledge that different courts may play different roles and, more
generally, viewing the question of judicial independence in all or nothing terms.
There is good, serious work about judicial independence in both the legal and
political science literatures, but there is too little of it, and too often the products have
been like ships passing in the night.I
My goal is to achieve a degree of rigor on the one hand, and of flexibility on the
other hand, that is missing from most public policy debates about, and much of the
legal and political science literatures on, judicial independence. Many people simply
assume that there is agreement about what judicial independence is, thereby relieving
them of the duty to state precisely what they mean when invoking the term. Many
others are quite clear what they mean byjudicial independence, but their definitions
are so obviously the product of the academy (or of self-interest) that they are ill-suited
for the practical business of government. Still others capitalize on the multiplicity of
possible meanings ofjudicial independence, with the same result.
These barriers to understanding and hence to progress tend to reflect, and to some
extent may be due to, three fundamental shortcomings. The first is the failure to
recognize and/or faithfully to incorporate in analysis the fact that, when the mists of
rhetoric have parted, in no modem political society of which I am aware is judicial
independence itself a goal of government. Those responsible for the formal structures
of government, and for the informal norms that fill up their interstices, do not seek
whatever degree of independence they favor for the judiciary because they believe
that judicial independence is itself normatively desirable. Rather, judicial
independence is a means to an end (or, more probably, to more than one end).2
The second and third shortcomings are related to, at least in the sense that they
may be encouraged by, the first. Thus, and second, discussions of judicial
I "There is no literature on judicial independence; rather, there are 'literatures'." Stephen B.
Burbank et al., Introduction, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 3 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) [hereinafter
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS].
2 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture ofJudicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. REv. 315
(1999).
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independence often proceed on the erroneous premise, stated or unstated, that judicial
independence and judicial accountability are discrete concepts at war with each other,
when in fact they are complementary concepts that can and should be regarded as
allies. This supposed dichotomy between independence and accountability is a
favorite target of legal scholars in search of a paradox; when it is found to be present,
many political scientists regard it as proof that judicial independence is a myth (or a
hypothesis not confirmed). The instrumental view of judicial independence taken
here, on the other hand, requires no dichotomy and sees no paradox, since it proceeds
from the premise that judicial independence and judicial accountability "are different
sides ofthe same coin."3 An accountable judiciary without any independence is weak
and feeble. An independent judiciary without any accountability is dangerous. 4
The third shortcoming of many discussions of judicial independence is the
erroneous assumption that judicial independence is a monolith. According to this
view, judicial independence has the same value, even if instrumental value, no matter
what the court. Most legal scholars who write about judicial independence know
nothing and care less about state courts. 5 Their incentive structures or utility functions
reflect the prominence and prestige of the federal courts in general, and of the
Supreme Court of the United States in particular. 6 To their great credit, political
scientists have not similarly dispensed with those courts that conduct the great,
majority ofjudicial business in this country. At the same time, however, much of the
high profile political science work on judicial independence has similarly
concentrated on the Supreme Court, attention that may be due to some of the same
incentives operating in the legal academy but that surely also reflects the current
perceived need for practitioners of the science to quantify and measure, and their need
for data with which to do so.7
Whatever the reasons for the failure of most scholars of the subject to consider,
let alone study, state courts and federal trial and intermediate appellate courts, the
3 Id. at 339 (emphasis added); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The PastandPresentofJudicial
Independence, 80 JUDICATURE 117, 117-18 (1996).
4 See THE CONSTITUTION OF PHILLIPS ACADEMY, ANDOVER MASSACHUSETrs 11-12 (rev. ed.
1995) (on file with the author):
But, above all, it is expected, that the Master's attention to the disposition of the Minds and
Morals of the Youth, under his charge, will exceed every other care; well considering that,
though goodness without knowledge (as it respect others) is weak and feeble; yet knowledge
without goodness is dangerous; and that both united form the noblest character, and lay the
surest foundation of usefulness to mankind.
5 For a recent notable exception, see Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and
Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998,
at 79.
6 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 81-144 (1995).
7 See Paul Brace & Kellie Sims Butler, New Perspectives for the Comparative Study of the
Judiciary: The State Supreme Court Project, 22 JUsT. SYs. J. 243, 243-46 (2001).
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insight that judicial independence is a means to an end (or ends) and not an end in
itself suggests that the quantum and quality of independence (and accountability)
enjoyed by different courts in different systems, and indeed by different courts within
the same system, may not be, and perhaps should not be, the same. To that extent
judicial independence is not a monolith. Indeed, it could be otherwise only if the
architects of, and the major players in, the governments of all American polities had
the same attitudes towards and aspirations for their judiciaries, and for every court
within their judicial system. Both history and a comparison of the arrangements that
different states have made and now make for their courts tell us that this cannot be so.
The point is also clear when one tries to imagine a general theory of judicial
independence and takes account of experience in different (foreign) legal systems, as
it does when one tries to conceive a general theory of independence as a tool of
modem government.
II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IS A MEANS TO AN END (OR ENDS)
No rational politician, and probably no sensible person, would want courts to
enjoy complete decisional independence, by which I mean freedom to decide a case
as the court sees fit without any constraint, exogenous or endogenous, actual or
prospective. 8 Courts are institutions run by human beings. Human beings are subject
to selfish and/or venal motives, and even moral paragons differ in the quality of their
mental faculties and in their capacity for judgment and wisdom. In a society that did
not invest judges with divine guidance (or its equivalent), the decision would not be
made to submit disputes for resolution to courts that were wholly unaccountable for
their decisions. One implication of this proposition is that, from a pre-modem,
anthropological perspective, we need law to constrain judges rather than judges to
serve the rule of law.9
As the reference to the rule of law may suggest, completely independent courts in
this sense would also be intolerable because they would render impossible the orderly
conduct of the social and economic affairs of a society. Citizens would not and could
not long turn to courts for the resolution of their disputes if the result of each case
were an immaculate conception, worthless for the govemance of future conduct and,
to citizens unguided by authoritative norms, apparmely in conflict with the decision in
another case involving similar facts and similar equities. In such a world, an
opportunity to appeal to a higher court would represent insult added to injury, which
helps to explain why, even in systems where first instance courts are in theory not
8 See Louis Michael Seidman, The Impossibility of Judicial Independence (undated)
(unpublished paper prepared for the AJS/Brennan Center Conference, see supra note *) (on file
with the author).
9 See Oscar G. Chase, A Speculation on Judicial Independence, Triadic Disputing, and
Cultural Legitimacy (January 31, 2001) (unpublished paper prepared for the AJS/Brennan Center
Conference, see supra note *) (on file with the author).
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constrained by precedent, such as Italy, they do not lightly depart from the law as
previously articulated by a higher court.10
Thus, once a political society accepts the importance of law for the prospective
governance of human affairs, courts cannot be accorded complete decisional
independence. In societies that divide responsibility for making such law among
different institutions, similar considerations require the creation of a hierarchy of
authority providing decision rules for the resolution of conflict between or among
those institutions. Unless such rules always privilege the views of the society's courts,
complete decisional independence is for that reason also impossible. I I
In fact, most developed political societies privilege law made by legislatures. In
such societies courts have the obligation to interpret and apply (subject to constraints
found in a written or unwritten constitution) legislative law, with which obligation
complete decisional independence is obviously and fatally inconsistent.12
No American federal or state court of which I am aware has ever enjoyed
complete decisional independence, and if that is what judicial independence is taken
to mean, as a historical matter it is, indeed, a myth. 13 Moreover, and more important
for present purposes, consideration of just the formal arrangements governing
American courts reveals that the aspirations of those responsible for their creation and
continued operation could not have included complete decisional independence.
Consider the federal courts, not because of their prominence or prestige, but
because they appear to enjoy the greatest measure of judicial independence of any
American courts. 14 The Constitution confers on Congress the power to impeach and
10 See MAURO CAPPELLETrl ET AL., THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION 246-47,
252-53, 270-73 (1967); Carlo Guamieri, Judicial Independence in Latin Countries of Western
Europe, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRMCAL PERSPECTIVES FROM
AROUND THE WORLD 111, 112-13 (Peter H. Russell & David M. O'Brien eds., 2001) [hereinafter
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY]. There are likely other reasons having to do
with the incentive structure in a career judiciary. See, e.g., Guamieri, supra, at 113; J. Mark
Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Skewed Incentives: Payingfor Politics as a Japanese Judge, 83
JUDICATURE 190 (2000).
11 Taking Professor Rubin's perspective, complete decisional independence is revealed as
intolerable for any institution of government where power is shared. See Edward L. Rubin,
Independence as a Governance Mechanism, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS,
supra note 1, at 56-100. Moreover, attention to the allocation of government power suggests that,
even if complete decisional independence for courts were tolerable, unless a society were also
willing to give courts the means to enforce their decisions, it would be futile.
12 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Judicial Independence: A Structure for Analysis (December
21,2000) (unpublished paper prepared for the AJS/Brennan Center Conference, seesupra note *)
(on file with the author).
13 See Herbert Jacob, The Courts as PoliticalAgencies: An HistoricalAnalys is, 8 TUL. STUD.
POL. SCI. 9, 48, 50 (1962); Burbank, supra note 2, at 326.
14 The fact that decisions interpreting federal statutes can be effectively overruled by the
enactment of subsequent legislation might be deemed relevant to the subject of judicial
independence. Although one can certainly imagine a court avoiding a particular decision because
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remove Article III judges from office.' 5 It is true that a very strong norm has
developed against using this power in reaction to the content of judicial decisions
(and hence to coerce different decisions in the future). We should remember,
however, that the result in the early 1800s impeachment trial of Justice Samuel Chase,
which is regarded as generative of the norm, was very close.16
The Constitution also confers on Congress the power to determine which if any
lower federal courts will exist and, as interpreted, which if any of the cases and
controversies enumerated in Article m they will be enabled to hear, and even the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is subject to exceptions and regulations
Congress may prescribe.' 7 Although the triumph of judicial review and judicial
supremacy in the nineteenth century may have helped to persuade Congress that it
would be unconstitutional to strip the judges of the Commerce Court of their offices
when it abolished that court early in the twentieth century, it did abolish the court and
could take similar action in the future.' 8
Congress' formal powers to control or influence the decisions of the federal
courts are not confined to the impeachment process, court-stripping, and the
regulation of original and appellate jurisdiction. For Congress also decides how many
judges will sit on a given federal court. Some scholars conclude that it has added
justices to the Supreme Court directly to affect decisions on matters of great
importance to it. 19 Again, the fact that the failure of Roosevelt's 1937 court-packing
of concern that, in light of a high likelihood of override, the decision would be an embarrassment
or a futility, the phenomenon seems best considered as part of the allocation of lawmaking power.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 484 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("A
legislature, without exceeding its province, cannot reverse a determination once made in a
particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases.").
15 See U.S. CONST. art. fl, § 4.
16 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE
SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENTANDREW JOHNSON 74-105, 125 (1992); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 132 (2d ed. 1985); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS 136-37 (1950).
17 The text is literally accurate, see U.S. CONST. art. ]I', §§ 1, 2; Palmore v. United States, 411
U.S. 389,400-01 (1973), but here as elsewhere where congressional action requires legislation, the
executive is involved.
18 See WILLIAM S. CARPENTER, JuDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES WITH ESPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE TENURE OF FEDERAL JUDGES 78-100 (1918); Bany Friedman, The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 333, 431-32 (1998). Congress has also, albeit infrequently and not in modem times, sought
to exercise decisional control over the Supreme Court by regulating its calendar and appellate
jurisdiction. See CARPENTER, supra, at 76-77; REHNQUIST, supra note 16, at 132; David P. Currie,
The Constitution in Congress: The Most Endangered Branch, 1801-1805, 33 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 219, 233 (1998).
19 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 378-79; G. Edward White, Salmon Portland Chase and
the Judicial Culture ofthe Supreme Court in the Civil War Era, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
CIVIL WAR 37-39,43 (Jennifer M. Lowe ed., 1996). But see Charles Gardner Geyh, Customary
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plan has generated (or confirmed) a strong norm against the use of the formal power
does not negate its existence or (entirely) eliminate the shadow it may cast.20
All of this would probably suffice to persuade one new to the study of our
institutional arrangements that the federal judiciary is the weakest and hence "least
dangerous" branch.21 Yet, I have not even considered that which prompted Hamilton
so to describe it in The Federalist No. 78, namely that Congress wields the power of
the purse (controlling the budget of the federal courts), while the Executive wields the
power of the sword (being responsible for the enforcement ofjudicial decisions). Nor,
of course, have I considered state court systems, in most of which the judges of at
least some courts must stand for some form of election and serve for terms far shorter
than life.22
These formal exogenous constraints are potent evidence against any assertion,
explicit or implicit, that the "judicial independence" we use as a label to describe the
result of the arrangements made for the federal judiciary means, or could possibly
have been intended to mean, complete decisional independence. It is also likely that
the architects of those arrangements envisioned and thus took into account
endogenous constraints on decisional independence. Law itself may have been
thought to function as such a constraint, at least to the extent that it was (sincerely)
believed to be determinate and discoverable (as opposed to indeterminate and
judicially created). 23 The existence in the Constitution of both the Supreme Court and
the Supremacy Clause suggests others, to wit, a hierarchy of authority and at least the
beginnings of institutional hierarchy.24
For these purposes it is not necessary to agree about-and I do not here seek to
identify-the goals that the architects of the federal (or any other) court system
actually did seek to achieve in providing the measure ofjudicial independence they
Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 1, at 176 ( "Either
court packing was not their dominant motivation or they recognized that their plans to court pack
ran counter to established norms against such a practice and so needed to be obscured.").
20 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 322-23. More subtly, Congress can use the power not to add
judges to overburdened lower courts as a means to discipline those courts for unpopular decisions
or simply to keep them busy and out of trouble. Similar motivation probably helps to explain the
refusal of early Congresses to heed the pleas of the Justices of the Supreme Court that they be
relieved of the onerous business of riding circuit. See Jacob, supra note 13, at 21-27.
21 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
22 See Am. Judicature Soc'y, Judicial Selection in the States: Appellate and General
Jurisdiction Courts, at http://www.ajs.org/Judicial%20Selection%2OCharts3.pdf (last updated
December 2000).
23 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 330, 336.
24 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. VI. Recent scholarship on the history of the struggles
for judicial review and judicial supremacy, however, cautions us about inferences in that regard
from the time of the founding. See Friedman, supra note 18. A recent decision exploring the
history of precedent in this country is another reminder not to retroject modem views to that period.
See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
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did, or that the architects of the future should seek to achieve. Professor Rubin's
general approach, reflecting the modem administrative state, causes him to dismiss
the contemporary relevance of separation of powers and to highlight the due process
values served by decisional independence.25 Professor Scheppele's awareness that
due process, however important, may yield nothing more than arid formalism and her
concern with constitutional courts in developing democracies cause her to highlight
judicial review.26 The framers of the United States Constitution appear to have sought
to achieve both goals in making the arrangements they did for the federal judiciary.27
The United States is not the same country it was in 1787, and although our
Constitution has changed very little in the intervening years, the same cannot be said
about our notions of law and lawmaking. Moreover, as we have seen, the Constitution
would provide very little protection against an executive and legislature intent on
controlling the decisional independence of the federal courts. Finally, change rather
than permanence has been the norm in the architecture of the arrangements that
formally determine state court independence. 28 This suggests that, as the ends to be
achieved change, so (subject to federal or state constitutions) may the means.
III. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY ARE
DIFFERENT SIDES OF THE SAME COIN
In previous work positing as the central goal of the architects of federal judicial
independence the enablement of judicial review, I explored the implications of the
fact that the legal arrangements whose consequences are described by the terms
"judicial independence" and "judicial accountability" are separately situated in the
Constitution.
If this were all, one might plausibly maintain that, because the legal arrangements
whose consequences they describe are separately situated in the Constitution,
judicial independence and judicial accountability are analytically discrete concepts,
at least as they concern the federal judiciary. Even on those terms, however, the
argument would be difficult to maintain. That is because, as a concept that describes
the consequences of legal arrangements, judicial independence invites attention to
that which it denies, a process that quickly directs attention to the importance of
context and purpose.
Once one has formulated the concept of judicial independence in light of its
purposes, it becomes clear that, at the federal level, "the article respecting
25 See Rubin, supra note 11.
26 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Declarations of Independence: Judicial Reactions to Political
Pressure, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 1, at 227-79.
27 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 318-26, 335-39.
28 See Lee Epstein et al., Selecting Selection Systemns, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS, supra note 1, at 191-226.
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impeachments" is not the "only provision" that confers power, the exercise of which
would deny the power of federal courts to make decisions free of executive or
legislative control. Indeed, the impeachment article has become a virtual dead letter
for that purpose, but, as we have seen, the political branches are hardly without
alternative weapons.
To some extent, confusion on this matter may arise from the restricted meaning of
"judicial accountability" that follows from consideration of the limits history has
imposed on the federal impeachment power. But again, as a purposive legal
concept, judicial independence is not so restricted, and in thinking about the level of
executive or legislative control or influence that is compatible with a desired level of
independence, we are thinking about accountability. The same is true in states with
elective systems, where the inquiry also includes the level of popular control or
influence.29
The temptation to place judicial independence and judicial accountability in
opposition may be difficult to resist if one views the problem of independence for
judges as a unique phenomenon. The truth is that, to the contrary, independence is a
tool used by those responsible for the structure and operation of many government
institutions. 30 This perspective instantiates, and thus highlights the importance of, an
instrumental approach to the concept of independence. Moreover, to the extent that
we are not hostage to history and that constitutions permit, viewing the judiciary as
one part of a complex governmental apparatus holds more promise of yielding a
realistic conception of what it is we seek from courts today, and the balance between
independence and accountability that we must afford them in order to get it, than an
account that is stuck in 1787 and/or that disembodies (usually through apotheosis)
courts and their independence.
Both the realization that judicial independence and judicial accountability are
different sides of the same coin and the knowledge that achieving the proper balance
between them is not a challenge unique to the judiciary should assist in identifying
and understanding the complex set of informal norms and understandings that may
have more practical importance to judicial independence (and accountability) than
any formal rules.3 1 Insisting on the traditional dichotomy or on the uniqueness of the
judiciary, to the contrary, obscures the processes of interaction and dialogue that we
29 Burbank, supra note 2, at 340.
30 See Rubin, supra note 11. Once one recognizes that, from an instrumental perspective,
judicial independence is not unique, the possibility emerges both that theoretical work on
independence confined to the judiciary is incompletely specified and that, as William Ross has
observed, historical inquiry so cabined may miss trends that tend to affect the independence of
other institutions of government as well. See William G. Ross, Suggestions for Future Research on
Judicial Independence 2 (undated) (unpublished paper prepared for AJSiBrennan Center
Conference, see supra note *) (on file with the author).
31 See, e.g., Geyh, supra note 19.
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know characterize institutional relationships in other systems, both ancient32 and very
new,33 and that I believe also characterize such relationships in this country.
Finally, viewing judicial independence and accountability as the joint product of
purposive legal and political arrangements helps one to understand the weaknesses of
another traditional dichotomy encountered in the literature: that between the
independence of an individual judge and the independence of the court and/or judicial
system of which that judge is a member:
The capacity of the judiciary, federal and state, to function independently of control
by the executive and legislative branches ... requires the capacity of individual
judges to enjoy [a measure of] extrainstitutional independence. It also requires that
the judiciary, as a system of courts, function and be perceived to function according
to law. This in turn requires that individual judges yield some intrainstitutional
independence. 34
IV. JuDICIAL INDEPENDENCE Is NOT A MONOLITH
(UNLESS THE ENDS ARE ALWAYS AND EVERYWHERE THE SAME)
I have suggested that the utility function of academics helps to explain the
preoccupation of scholars, particularly legal scholars, with federal courts in general
and the Supreme Court in particular.35 Normative scholarship gravitates towards
institutions that are perceived to be prestigious and influential because good
scholarship may have an impact on the work of such institutions and because that is
where, even for scholarship that does not seek to have such an impact, the prestige
and influence of legal scholars are thought to lie. In part for the same reasons, such
institutions attract empirical study and thus generate the data that contemporary
political scientists require for their work.
If this is correct it helps to explain why those who write, and/or participate in
policy debates, about judicial independence tend to refer to it as if it were a monolith,
a concept having the same meaning everywhere and at all times. That tendency is in
any event unsurprising to the extent that the individual in question treats judicial
independence as an end in itself. Moreover, such a unitary goal would naturally take
its shape from that which those harboring it know best, to wit, federal judicial
independence (and the independence enjoyed by the Supreme Court in particular). 36
32 See Robert Stevens, Judicial Independence in England: A Loss ofInnocence, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 10, at 155-72.
33 See Scheppele, supra note 26.
34 Burbank, supra note 2, at 342 (footnote omitted).
35 See supra text accompanying note 7.
36 Yet, as the legal realists taught us, even though the tendency to assume that the same word
means the same thing in different contexts "has all the tenacity of original sin," it "must constantly
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Of course, few scholars labor under this fallacy in fact, well recognizing the
possibility that, even if they do not pause to inquire why, the quantum and quality of
judicial independence (and accountability) may vary dramatically among courts in the
United States. One reason they may not pause to inquire, however, has to do with a
normative commitment to judicial independence on the federal model.37 Such a
normative commitment constitutes both a further disincentive to study state court
systems (were it needed!) and an impediment to an instrumental understanding of
judicial independence. 38
Even if one is predisposed for normative reasons to the federal model, an
instrumental view ofjudicial independence (and accountability) requires attention to
what it is that we seek from courts and to possible differences in that regard among
the various court systems in the United States and among courts within the same
system. Although the inquiry must attend to both formal (including constitutional)
and informal constraints on changing the arrangements we make for courts and
judges that bear on their independence and accountability, it simply will not do to
read into constitutions protections that are not there or to pretend that informal norms
will last forever. Here as elsewhere in the American legal landscape, comparative
scholarship is most valuable for the light it sheds on domestic institutions, and here as
elsewhere in scholarship that attends to functional relationships, it is useless to
proceed as if nothing had changed since 1787.
On this view, rather than, for example, simply dismissing as defective state court
systems where judges are not appointed and do not enjoy life tenure, and before
seeking to bring about change in such systems, we need to try to make precise what it
is we seek from courts, the degree of decisional independence (and accountability)
that is necessary or desirable in order to achieve that end, and the arrangements,
formal and informal, that are best calculated to yield that quantum of independence
(and accountability). Although unable to elaborate this research agenda in great detail
here, I set forth below some possible distinctions that may be helpful, if only in
burying more deeply all three of the fallacies with which I am concerned in this
article: that judicial independence is an end in itself, that it is in opposition to judicial
accountability, and that it is a monolith.
be guarded against." WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT
OFLAWS 159 (1942).
37 This commitment itself may be a product of the academic utility function and, depending
upon the historical period, may also reflect ideological allegiance to the products of federal
litigation.
38 There is irony in this neglect of state institutions, particularly in the legal scholarship on
judicial independence. For, as the work of Jack Rakove has made clear, Madison was very
attentive to those institutions and sought to prevent the excesses he perceived there in the
arrangements he helped to fashion for the new federal government, including federal courts. See
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: PoLITcs AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OFTHE CONSTiTION
290 (1996).
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A. Federal vs. State Courts
From an instrumental perspective, the assertion or assumption that the only
suitable arrangements affecting judicial independence (and accountability) for courts
in the United States are those that have been and are made for federal courts implies
not only that the latter are appropriate given the roles and functions of federal courts
but that there are for these purposes no relevant differences between federal and state
courts (or federal and state judges). Putting to one side evaluation of the federal
arrangements, the hypothesis, in other words, is that there is nothing different about
the roles and functions of state and federal courts, or the influences affecting their
judges, that should cause those responsible for the rules that determine decisional
independence (and accountability) to make different choices. A thorough evaluation
of this hypothesis would be an enormous undertaking, requiring a detailed
investigation of the various state court systems, the business they conduct, and their
place in the larger political landscapes in which they are situated. The present
occasion permits only the suggestion of some general considerations that may be
useful in testing it.
Having said that I was putting the appropriateness of federal arrangements to the
side, my first consideration nevertheless brings that question back on the scene. I raise
it, however, because the federal model is likely to provide the baseline for
comparative analysis of judicial roles and functions. It is the question of the
significance, if any, that should be accorded the fact that the makers of the
Constitution provided only for a Supreme Court, leaving to Congress the decision
whether to create lower federal courts and if so to define the scope of their subject
matter jurisdiction. 39 Whatever the makers thought Congress was likely to do,40 the
arrangements they made that formally determined the decisional independence (and
accountability) of the federal judiciary would clearly and surely apply only to a high
court, one moreover operating under a constitutional provision (the Supremacy
Clause) that can (but need not) be read to contemplate judicial review.41
Whatever the implications of the Supremacy Clause for judicial review, its chief
bite lies in the hierarchy of authority it establishes between federal and state law and
the obligation it imposes on all courts, federal and state, to respect that hierarchy.
With the acceptance ofjudicial review, that obligation extends to striking down state
and federal laws found to be inconsistent with the federal constitution. Thus, unlike
39 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
40 See Geyh, supra note 19, at 168-69.
41 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
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the situation in a number of modem democratic societies, where there is a separate
constitutional court with a monopoly on constitutional decisions, the members of
which are subject to selection and retention arrangements quite different from the
members of other courts, 42 every court in the United States is a constitutional court.
To permit the consideration of the federal business of state courts to drive the
inquiry into their roles and functions would be, however, again to exalt (in this case,
without having separately evaluated) the federal model of arrangements bearing on
decisional independence (and accountability). Moreover, and apart from the
availability of Supreme Court review of the decisions of state courts on federal
questions, the federal legislature and executive lack obvious means to control the
decisions of state courts, to that extent negating the primary historic functional
justification for the federal arrangements.43 Of course, it may be that within a given
state effective performance of the role of state constitutional judicial review might be
thought to require functionally equivalent decisional independence. The question
would then be whether the federal arrangements are the only or the best means to
bring it about.4 4
Finally in this aspect, particularly if testing the hypothesis proceeds, explicitly or
implicitly, by comparison of state with federal judicial roles and functions, it may be
important to pay close attention to the respective lawmaking powers of those courts.
The common lawmaking power of the courts of most states has long been recognized
as extensive (whether as a power to make law or simply to find it). At least since early
in the Republic the federal courts have not been thought endowed with comparable
power as to questions of federal law, and their ability to bring about functionally
similar results in state law diversity cases has been seriously constrained since 1938. 4 5
Moreover, recent scholarship suggests that structural differences between state and
federal courts call for very different limitations on their authority. 46
B. Trial vs. Intermediate Appellate vs. Supreme (High) Courts
We can never know whether, although it seems unlikely that, the makers of the
Constitution would have fashioned different arrangements bearing on decisional
independence (and accountability) for the lower federal courts than for the Supreme
Court if they had established the former in that document rather than leaving
decisions conceming them to Congress. If we knew the answer to that question was
42 See Guarnieri, supra note 10, at 112-15; Scheppele, supra note 26, at 247-68.
43 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 331.
44 See id. at 331-35; HURST, supra note 16, at 138-46.
45 See Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1003,
1005 (1985); Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463,1475 (1987).
46 See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues ": Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1833 (2001); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State
Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1131 (1999).
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negative, however, we still would not know much of significance for testing the
hypothesis set forth above. For, as we have seen, the formal protections of decisional
independence in the Constitution are dwarfed by those formal powers that could be
used to control or influence decisions, and informal arrangements and understandings
reached in their shadow may be far more significant to the quantum and quality of
federal judicial independence (and accountability).
Rather, I have raised the question as one means of encouraging attention to the
notion that, because different courts within a given judicial system may play different
roles, the arrangements we make for them that bear on their decisional independence
(and accountability) may appropriately vary. Thus, for example, one might explore
whether the same degree of insulation from political influence appropriate for a trial
court, deciding questions of fact and applying law in a hierarchical system of
precedent, is appropriate for an appellate court whose primary role is the creation of
precedent binding both in the case before it and in other similar cases.
The importance of judicial role is also a message carried by comparative
scholarship exploring the etiology and functions of constitutional courts in emerging
democracies.47 Indeed, it is a message that seems likely to emerge from empirical and
historical study of the means by which the members of different American courts
within the same system have been and are selected and/or retained (including their
terms of office).
As an example, data gathered throughout the country by the American Judicature
Society indicate that in at least ten states different selection systems are used for
members of trial and appellate courts.48 Careful study of those state systems may
reveal that one reason for the differences was their architects' belief that different
judicial functions warrant different degrees of judicial independence (and
accountability). 49
To take another example, when the question is federal judicial selection, there is a
tendency to conceive of the role of the President and/or of the Senate in monolithic
terms. Yet, as a number of studies clearly reveal, both have played very different roles
in connection with nominations and confirmations to seats on the district courts, the
courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court. 50 In a system where, from a political
science perspective, accountability is front-end-loaded, the role differences of those
responsible for selection thus have potentially significant implications for the
4 7 See Scheppele, supra note 26.
48 See Am. Judicature Soc'y, supra note 22.
49 It is a separate question whether careful normative analysis would support current
differences, particularly to the extent that they reflect the proposition that greater decisional
independence (less accountability) is appropriate for high courts than for trial courts. See infra text
accompanying note 52.
50 See, e.g., SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECION FROM
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997); Stephen B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege & Power: The
Senate 's Role in the Appointment of Federal Judges, 86 JUDICATURE 24 (2002).
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quantum and quality of decisional independence (and accountability), and they may
be due at least in part to views about differences in the roles and functions of the
courts to which appointments are to be made. 51
In studying the possible implications of role difference within a court system for
the arrangements that bear on decisional independence (and accountability), it will be
important to attend to both formal institutional structure and actual practice, to both
the allocation of power that is supposed to exist and that which does exist. These
inquiries will require attention to the theory and practice of precedent and of appellate
review within the system. Moreover, in connection with trial courts, it will be
important to consider the role of the jury.
One hypothesis such work might explore is that both a strong tradition of binding
authority and a hierarchical structure providing more than one opportunity for review
can act as powerful checks on decisional independence, and to that extent reduce the
need for other forms of decisional accountability.52 That hypothesis would not pass
unchallenged by political scientists, many of whom reject, if only because they cannot
measure, the constraining force of law.53 Perhaps, however, the reminder that political
science has told us very little about the independence and accountability of courts
other than the Supreme Court, coupled with attention to the point that even on that
court "judges often agree with one another, no doubt because the law is clear and they
follow it,"54 will help to soften positions. Progress of that sort would be facilitated if
legal scholars reciprocated by reading the political science literature and paid attention
to the part that politics plays in judicial decisionmaking.
This discussion has suggested a number of considerations that seem to me
important in pursing the possible relevance of different judicial roles for the
arrangements that determine the quantum and quality ofjudicial independence (and
accountability). The first is the importance of attending to changes in the roles and
functions of a court over time. The second consideration, related to the first, is the
importance of not permitting theory or formal structure to obscure actual practice. The
third consideration, related to the second, is the importance of not permitting the
extraordinary to obscure the ordinary.
51 A similar perspective may help to understand the recent phenomenon of "treat[ing] all
federal judicial appointments as if they were appointments to the Supreme Court." Editorial,
Clinton's Legacy or Bork's?, 84 JUDICATURE 224 (2001).
52 Professor Scheppele has likened a typical court structure to an inverse pyramid, pointing
out how increasing the size of the court as one goes up the system could moderate the effect of
individual partisanship and/or ideology. Kim Lane Scheppele, Remarks at the AJS/Brennan Center
Conference, see supra note * (March 31, 2001) (transcript on file with the author).
53 For recent progress in that regard, see, for example, Mark J. Richards & Herbert M.
Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCi. REv.
305 (2002).
54 Terri Jennings Peretti, Does Judicial Independence Exist? The Lessons of Social Science
Research, in JUDICLAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 1, at 111.
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I have speculated that the makers of the Constitution may have regarded law as a
consequential constraint on decisional independence and that such an attitude may
have affected the choices they made concerning the formal arrangements bearing on
such independence (and accountability) in the Constitution.55 I have also noted,
however, that attitudes towards law and lawmaking, particularly by judges, have
changed since 1787, developments that could affect one's views about the
appropriateness of those arrangements today. Moreover, wherever one looks in the
federal judicial hierarchy, there have been substantial changes in the work and role,
including the power, of the courts over time.56
Of course, just as it is important not to permit, for instance, the theory or tradition
of appellate review (i.e., published opinion after full briefing and oral argument) to
obscure the reality (i.e., judgment order after page-limited briefing and no oral
argument), so is it important not to forget that, at least in terms of numbers, ordinary
cases surely dwarf extraordinary cases, with judges usually agreeing about that which
they are pleased to call "the law." Perhaps most important, as we have seen, the
formal arrangements in the Constitution that could be used to constrain decisional
independence dwarf the formal protections and both may pale in significance to
informal norms and understandings reached in their shadow.
V. CONCLUSION
It may be that, at the end of the day, there is a core to the notion of judicial
independence, an irreducible normative essence that must be present in any political
system for a court to operate as such. The very statement of the proposition gives
pause, however, and a review of the fallacies described here well suggests the
problems with, and the limitations of, any effort to identify such a core.
Foremost is the fact that judicial independence is not an end in itself but a means
to an end, which requires that the inquiry focus on the goal(s) to be achieved in
determining the quantum and quality of independence (and accountability). It remains
for different polities to define what it is that they want from their courts and the
measure (or quality) ofjudicial independence they believe is necessary or appropriate
in order to secure it. Is there a goal that any enlightened architect of any judicial
55 See supra text accompanying note 23.
56 SeeDONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONwTNurY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS
OF APPEALS (2000); Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence,
Imagination and Ideology in the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLuM. L. REv. 1971, 1981-82
(1997); Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After
the Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643 (2000). Thus, the federal judicial hierarchy may
resemble an inverted pyramid, see supra note 52, but as proportionally fewer and fewer cases
proceed up the pyramid and are fully considered by a superior court, the potential for the system
effectively to constrain the decisional independence of inferior courts declines.
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system would want courts in that system to be able to achieve and for which a
measure of decisional independence would be necessary?
The fact that judicial independence is not a monolith requires that the search for a
core, and the consideration of social and political goals, comprehend (and consider
differences among) at least all courts within a given system, while the fact that
achieving a balance between independence and accountability is a. pervasive
challenge of institutional architecture requires that attention to history and formal
arrangements be tempered by a realistic appraisal of the practical needs of modem
government. A modem polity's goals for its judiciary will almost surely include
functions that require a measure of accountability, just as they do a measure of
independence.
All of this suggests what comparative scholarship on judicial independence
confirms, namely, the daunting obstacles that any attempt to develop a useful general
theory ofjudicial independence confronts. The obstacles may appear less formidable,
and the enterprise more tractable, to the extent that one assimilates other lessons of
such scholarship. One such lesson, confirming an insight from comparative
institutional scholarship, is that it is a mistake to take the measure of a court's judicial
independence (or accountability) exclusively from formal arrangements. 57 Another,
confirming the clear implication of an instrumental perspective, is that there are likely
to be more ways than one to bring about the same measure of independence (and
accountability).
What do we mean by "judicial independence"? It depends.
57 See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Discretion in the Career andRecognition Judiciary, 7 U.
CHI. ROUNDTABLE 205 (2000); J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A
Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEG. STuD. 721 (1994).
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